Niche News

CWMD 2025 Statistics

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Key takeaways

  • CWMD conducted 1,020 operations, engagements, trainings, and exercises across 48 states and territories in Calendar Year 2025.
  • The Mobile Detection Deployment Program (MDDP) conducted 132 operations in 43 states and territories.
  • The Security the Cities (STC) program worked with more than 675 partners across 14 High Risk Urban Areas to enhance detection and prevention of radiological and nuclear threats.
  • BioWatch provided 24/7 biodetection operations in 32 major metropolitan areas and supported more than 1,300 events, trainings, and exercises.
  • ChemPREP ran 18 seminars and 3 workshops across 8 states, engaging over 975 federal, state, and local partners who collectively serve over 54 million citizens.
  • TERA provided realistic training to over 3,000 federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (FSLTT) first responders through more than 100 events across 33 states and 1 U.S. territory.

Follow Up Questions

What is the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) and what is its mandate?Expand

The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security created by Congress in 2018 to lead DHS’s work against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and related threats. By law, it is headed by an Assistant Secretary who serves as the Secretary of Homeland Security’s principal adviser on WMD issues and coordinates DHS-wide efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to WMD threats. In practice, CWMD develops threat and risk assessments, acquires and deploys detection technologies, and runs training and exercises with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to improve U.S. preparedness against CBRN terrorism or incidents.

Who is Under Secretary Noem and what is their role at DHS?Expand

“Under Secretary Noem” in the article refers to Kristi Noem, who is actually the Secretary of Homeland Security (the Cabinet‑level head of DHS), not an Under Secretary. Official DHS and independent biographies describe her as the U.S. secretary of homeland security since 2025. The phrase in DHS press releases (“Under Secretary Noem’s leadership”) uses “under” as a preposition—meaning “under the leadership of Secretary Noem”—rather than as a job title. As Secretary, she sets overall DHS priorities and oversees components such as the CWMD Office.

What counts as an "operation, engagement, training, or exercise" in the reported total of 1,020?Expand

DHS does not publicly spell out a strict, numerical definition of each term in the 1,020‑event total for 2025, so the exact counting rules are not available. From CWMD and DHS program descriptions, these categories generally mean:

  • Operations – field deployments or mission activities (for example, MDDP deployments that bring CBRN detection equipment and staff to a location or event).
  • Engagements – coordination or planning interactions with partner agencies (such as meetings, workshops, or partner outreach sessions).
  • Trainings – formal instructional events that teach personnel how to use CBRN detection equipment or respond to WMD incidents (e.g., TERA or ChemPREP training).
  • Exercises – practice scenarios or drills where agencies rehearse responding to simulated CBRN threats. The 2025 statistics article lists totals for programs like MDDP, BioWatch, ChemPREP, and TERA but does not break down how many of the 1,020 were in each sub‑category or define them further.
What is the Mobile Detection Deployment Program (MDDP) and what types of detection equipment does it provide?Expand

The Mobile Detection Deployment Program (MDDP) is a DHS CWMD program that sends mobile teams, detection equipment, and technical experts around the country to help federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners detect chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats—often for major events, surge operations, or emerging threats. It evolved from earlier Mobile Detection Deployment Units.

According to DHS and procurement documents, MDDP provides and supports a range of detection systems, including for example:

  • Radiological/nuclear detection: personal radiation detectors (PRDs), radio‑isotope identification devices (RIIDs), backpack and vehicle‑mounted radiation detectors, and portal/area monitors.
  • Chemical and biological detection/assessment: portable CBRN detectors and related sampling, communications, and analysis equipment, along with subject‑matter experts to operate and interpret them.

In 2025, the CWMD statistics release notes that MDDP conducted 132 such operations across 43 states and territories.

What are "High Risk Urban Areas" and how are partners selected for the Security the Cities (STC) program?Expand

“High Risk Urban Areas” are metropolitan regions that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) identifies as being at particularly high risk of terrorist attack or related hazards. This designation is made under the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program in federal law (6 U.S.C. § 604), based on factors like population, critical infrastructure, and threat intelligence.

By statute, the Securing the Cities (STC) program can only select partner jurisdictions from among these FEMA‑designated high‑risk urban areas. The DHS Secretary (through CWMD) designates which of these urban areas will participate in STC. Once selected, STC then brings in regional partners—such as police, emergency management, transit agencies, and other public‑safety organizations—within that urban area to receive radiological/nuclear detection equipment, training, exercises, and planning support aimed at detecting and preventing radiological or nuclear attacks.

How does the BioWatch program detect biological attacks and what are its known limitations?Expand

BioWatch is DHS’s civilian biodetection system designed to give early warning if certain biological agents (like those that could be used in bioterrorism) are released into the air over major U.S. cities.

How it works (current generations):

  • Air samplers (“collectors”) are placed at fixed sites in participating metropolitan areas.
  • These collectors continuously pull in air; filters are removed manually on a regular schedule (typically daily).
  • Public‑health laboratories then test the filters, usually using PCR‑based methods, to detect genetic material from specific target pathogens.
  • A positive laboratory result can trigger a BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR), prompting public‑health investigation and, if warranted, emergency response.

Known limitations and criticisms:

  • Delay in detection: Because filters must be collected and taken to a lab, detection can be delayed by many hours to a day or more, which may reduce the benefit of “early” warning.
  • Limited agent list and coverage: It only tests for a predefined set of agents and only at fixed sampling locations, so releases outside those locations or involving non‑target agents may go undetected.
  • Environmental “positives” and interpretive challenges: Government and independent reviews note that BioWatch has detected naturally occurring background organisms that are similar to threat agents. These are technically true detections of DNA but not actual attacks, which has raised concern about confusion, potential false alarms, and the burden on public‑health agencies.
  • Technical and cost concerns: National Academies and congressional reviews have questioned whether the current (Generation 2) system is fast and reliable enough to justify its cost without significant technological upgrades.

These issues have led to ongoing efforts to improve or replace current BioWatch technologies with more automated and rapid systems.

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