Disrupting Iran’s UAV Proliferation to Venezuela and Iran’s Weapons Programs

The 10 parties sanctioned are:

• Venezuela-based Empresa Aeronáutica Nacional SA (EANSA), which assembles and maintains Iranian Mohajer‑series drones in Venezuela; and its chairman, José Jesús Urdaneta González.
• Iran-based Mostafa Rostami Sani; his company Pardisan Rezvan Shargh International Private Joint Stock Company; and Pardisan Rezvan Shargh’s managing director, Reza Zarepour Taraghi – all involved in procuring missile‑related chemicals for Parchin Chemical Industries.
• Iran-based Fanavari Electro Moj Mobin Company; its managing director, Bahram Rezaei; Iran-based Kavoshgaran Asman Moj Ghadir Company (KAMG); and KAMG managers Erfan Qaysari and Mehdi Ghaffari – all tied to the Rayan Fan Group, which supplies technology and components to Iran’s IRGC UAV and aerospace programs.

Combat UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) are military drones designed not just to observe but to attack: they carry bombs or missiles and can be flown remotely or along pre‑programmed routes. Iran’s Mohajer‑6, for example, can stay aloft for many hours, conduct surveillance, and fire small precision‑guided Qaem bombs, turning it into a low‑cost strike aircraft. Iranian‑designed drones are significant because they are relatively cheap, have been exported or copied widely (for example, Shahed‑series drones used by Russia in Ukraine and by regional militias), and give Iran and its partners a way to strike targets and gather intelligence without risking pilots, which worries the U.S. when such systems show up close to its territory, including in Venezuela.

National Security Presidential Memorandum‑2 (NSPM‑2), issued on February 4, 2025, is a White House directive setting overall U.S. policy toward Iran. It orders agencies to impose “maximum pressure” on Iran: deny it any path to a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles, curtail its ballistic‑missile and other weapons programs, cut off revenue to the regime and the IRGC, and isolate Iran diplomatically. NSPM‑2 itself does not create new sanctions laws; instead, it instructs departments such as Treasury, State, Justice, and Commerce to use and tighten existing sanctions, export controls, law‑enforcement tools, and UN mechanisms to pursue those goals.

Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 (2005) and E.O. 13949 (2020) are both U.S. sanctions authorities but target different aspects of Iran’s weapons activities:

• E.O. 13382 (“Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters”) lets the U.S. freeze U.S.-linked property of entities and individuals worldwide involved in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their delivery systems, and those providing them material, financial, or technological support. It is broad and not limited to Iran.
• E.O. 13949 (“Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to the Conventional Arms Activities of Iran”) is narrower and Iran‑specific. It targets people and entities involved in supplying, selling, or transferring conventional arms and related materiel to or from Iran, or materially supporting such deals. In this sanctions action, 13382 is used mainly against actors procuring missile‑related chemicals and UAV technology, while 13949 is used against those tied to Iran’s conventional arms exports, such as combat drones to Venezuela.

According to the U.S. Treasury, the evidence consists mainly of documented procurement and sales relationships:

• For UAVs: Venezuela’s Empresa Aeronáutica Nacional SA (EANSA) is described as assembling and maintaining Iranian Qods Aviation Industries (QAI) Mohajer‑series drones in Venezuela, negotiating directly with QAI, and helping secure “millions of dollars’ worth of Mohajer‑6” sales. EANSA also maintains the ANSU‑100 (a locally branded, armed Mohajer‑2 derivative) for the Venezuelan military.
• For ballistic missiles: Mostafa Rostami Sani and his company Pardisan Rezvan Shargh are said to have procured large quantities of sodium perchlorate, sebacic acid, and nitrocellulose for Parchin Chemical Industries, part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization that supplies solid rocket‑motor propellants and materials for ballistic missiles.
• For IRGC UAV/aerospace programs: Fanavari Electro Moj Mobin and Kavoshgaran Asman Moj Ghadir (KAMG), led by Bahram Rezaei, Erfan Qaysari, and Mehdi Ghaffari, are linked to the Rayan Fan Group, previously sanctioned for producing components for the IRGC’s UAV program and software for its aerospace arm. These transactional links and prior designations are cited by OFAC as the basis for treating them as nodes in Iran’s missile and UAV procurement networks.

The sanctions harden U.S.–Venezuela tensions and are framed in Washington as a response to a growing Iranian‑backed military presence near U.S. territory. By targeting EANSA and its chair, the U.S. is trying to choke off Venezuela’s ability to buy, assemble, and maintain Iranian Mohajer‑series combat drones, which U.S. officials say threaten U.S. interests and allies in the Western Hemisphere. Treasury explicitly labels Iran’s arms transfers to Caracas “a threat to U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere, including the Homeland,” and pairs these sanctions with a broader U.S. military buildup and surveillance effort in the Caribbean. Practically, the measures restrict Venezuelan and Iranian defense entities’ access to the U.S. financial system and raise the risk that foreign banks dealing with them could face secondary sanctions, which is meant to deter further UAV and missile cooperation but may also push Caracas to deepen security ties with Iran and other U.S. rivals.

Enforcement and monitoring will rely mainly on U.S. sanctions machinery:

• OFAC has added these parties to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, so U.S. persons and banks must block any of their property or transactions that touch the U.S. financial system and report them to Treasury.
• Non‑U.S. banks risk secondary sanctions if they knowingly conduct significant transactions for the designated parties, giving Washington leverage to pressure foreign intermediaries.
• U.S. agencies will use financial‑transaction screening, customs and export‑control checks, intelligence collection, and information from allies to spot evasion (for example, front companies or rerouted shipments). OFAC’s enforcement guidelines allow it to impose civil penalties on a strict‑liability basis, meaning entities can be fined even without proving they knew they were dealing with a sanctioned party. These tools together are how the U.S. intends to police compliance with the new Iran–Venezuela drone and missile sanctions.