White House Announces New DOJ National Fraud Enforcement Division and Details Minnesota-Centered Crackdown

Public information so far indicates the new national fraud enforcement division will mainly reorganize and centralize existing DOJ fraud powers rather than create brand‑new legal authorities. The fact sheet says the division will:

• Use existing federal criminal and civil fraud statutes (e.g., wire fraud, health‑care fraud, False Claims Act) against fraud involving federal programs, federally funded benefits, businesses, nonprofits, and private citizens nationwide.
• Consolidate and direct multi‑district, multi‑agency fraud investigations and double prosecutorial resources in major hotspots like Minnesota, functioning as a national coordination hub above individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices.
• Set nationwide fraud‑enforcement priorities and propose legislative and regulatory changes to close systemic vulnerabilities. Current DOJ components such as the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section already have many of these tools, but the new division is described as a dedicated, department‑wide structure focused solely on fraud across all program areas and jurisdictions, with its own Assistant Attorney General and an explicit mandate to coordinate other DOJ units and agencies. Because the Administration has not yet released an executive order, statute, or DOJ order formally establishing the division, there is no publicly available document spelling out additional, unique legal authorities beyond this policy and coordination role.

According to the fact sheet, the new Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for national fraud enforcement would differ from current DOJ fraud leaders in three main ways:

• Scope: Existing officials (for example, the head of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section) oversee specific subject‑matter areas such as health care, securities, or foreign bribery. The new AAG is described as overseeing fraud enforcement against all federal programs and federally funded benefits, as well as fraud affecting businesses, nonprofits, and private citizens nationwide.
• Role as coordinator: The new AAG is explicitly tasked with leading multi‑district and multi‑agency fraud investigations and giving direction and assistance on fraud issues to all U.S. Attorney’s Offices, effectively sitting above and coordinating their work, rather than just running a specialized section.
• Policy and advisory authority: The fact sheet states this AAG will set national enforcement priorities on fraud, recommend legislative and regulatory reforms, and advise the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General on “significant, high‑impact” fraud cases and related policies. Current fraud‑section chiefs contribute to policy, but this position is framed as the central, department‑wide policy voice on fraud. No more detailed organizational chart or DOJ order has been published yet, so these differences are based on the duties described in the White House summary compared with DOJ’s existing Fraud Section leadership role.

Public charging documents and state press releases describe the main alleged fraud types in the Minnesota programs as:

• Feeding Our Future (federal child‑nutrition programs): Prosecutors say participants falsely claimed to have served huge numbers of meals to low‑income children during COVID‑19, when in reality many meals were never served. Defendants are accused of fabricating meal counts and attendance records, inflating the number of children served (sometimes to levels impossible for the neighborhoods involved), and then diverting millions of dollars into personal spending and overseas transfers instead of food for kids.
• Housing Stabilization Services (HSS) (Medicaid‑funded housing support): Federal indictments and the Minnesota Attorney General allege providers billed Minnesota’s Medicaid program for HSS services that were not actually provided or were far in excess of what clients received, sometimes continuing to bill even when clients were already in stable housing.
• Evergreen Recovery and related Medicaid schemes: State and federal authorities say the treatment provider systematically overbilled Medicaid for substance‑use treatment that was not provided, falsified records (for example, adding client names to logs after the fact), and used free or discounted housing as an illegal kickback to keep clients enrolled so their identities could be used to generate more fraudulent billing. These types of conduct—billing for services not rendered, fabricating documentation, and kickback schemes—are consistent with the general description in the fact sheet of “fraudulent activity” in Minnesota’s Medicaid‑linked programs.

When HHS or CMS pauses or freezes childcare or Medicaid payments to address suspected fraud, eligible people who did nothing wrong can face serious short‑term harm:

• Childcare: A federal funding freeze to Minnesota’s childcare programs has already left legitimate daycare centers without expected subsidy payments, forcing some to take on debt, delay wages, reduce hours, or threaten closure. Families who rely on subsidies may suddenly have to cover full fees, scramble for alternative care, or risk losing jobs if they cannot find childcare.
• Medicaid services: CMS’s pause on payments to 14 Minnesota Medicaid‑funded programs flagged for fraud means that, unless the state or other providers step in, some patients can experience interrupted services (for example, housing supports, behavioral or autism therapy, or substance‑use treatment). Even if states try to backfill, confusion and delays in authorizations or provider changes can disrupt care for eligible beneficiaries. In both cases, the agencies say the pauses are targeted at high‑risk providers rather than cutting off all aid, and they often require states to redirect clients to compliant providers. But until that is fully in place, innocent beneficiaries can experience gaps in care and financial or logistical strain.

Operation Twin Shield is a Department of Homeland Security–led, multi‑agency immigration‑fraud crackdown in the Minneapolis–St. Paul area. According to USCIS and related DHS statements, it involved large‑scale site visits and investigations to uncover:

• Suspected immigration benefits fraud (e.g., sham marriages, false asylum or refugee claims, and fabricated documents such as fake foreign death certificates);
• Possible ineligibility or misrepresentation by individuals who obtained or sought legal status; and
• Cases that might warrant additional vetting, removal proceedings, or even denaturalization. The White House fact sheet ties Operation Twin Shield directly into the broader Minnesota fraud effort, stating that DHS, as part of Operation Twin Shield, identified more than 1,300 potential fraud findings at sites in Minneapolis and St. Paul and is now vetting those cases for immigration and refugee‑status issues. This operation runs alongside, and in coordination with, the DOJ, FBI, and HHS investigations into financial fraud in Minnesota’s social‑service and benefits programs.

HHS’s ability to require immigration sponsors to repay Medicaid costs rests on existing federal immigration law, not a new statute. The key legal basis is:

• Section 213A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1183a. It makes a sponsor who signs Form I‑864 (Affidavit of Support) a “joint and several” obligor for means‑tested public benefits used by the sponsored immigrant and authorizes federal and state agencies that administer such programs to seek reimbursement.
• CMS’s 2019 State Health Official letter (SHO 19‑004) clarified that for immigrants with enforceable I‑864s, states may (and in some circumstances must) pursue repayment from sponsors for Medicaid and CHIP benefits, consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1183a. The fact sheet says HHS is now “enforcing a long‑ignored Federal law” by actively sending repayment demands to sponsors where sponsored immigrants used Medicaid. That is an exercise of authority Congress already granted in the INA and that CMS has previously interpreted in guidance to states.

The fact sheet states that CMS determined Minnesota’s Medicaid agency was operating “in substantial noncompliance with Federal requirements,” but it does not publish the underlying CMS findings. Based on CMS policy and typical enforcement practice, such a determination usually reflects:

• Significant failures in program‑integrity controls (for example, inadequate verification that services were actually delivered, weak oversight of high‑risk providers, or delayed action after credible fraud allegations);
• Noncompliance with federal rules for claiming federal matching funds, maintaining documentation, and ensuring payments are only made to eligible providers for covered services; and
• Systemic vulnerabilities leading to high levels of improper or potentially fraudulent payments. Public reporting on Minnesota’s situation indicates that CMS flagged 14 Medicaid‑funded programs that the state itself had already identified as involving credible allegations of fraud, and then froze federal payments to those programs pending audits and validation of claims. However, the detailed criteria and evidence CMS used for its formal “substantial noncompliance” determination have not been released in full, so they are not publicly knowable beyond these general program‑integrity standards.

Federal agencies coordinate complex, multi‑district and multi‑agency fraud investigations through a combination of formal structures and case‑specific mechanisms designed to reduce duplication and manage relations with states. In practice, they typically:

• Designate a lead DOJ component and U.S. Attorney’s Office: For large schemes like the Minnesota cases, DOJ designates a lead U.S. Attorney (here, the District of Minnesota) and lead sections within Main Justice, which then coordinate with other districts when fraud crosses state lines.
• Form joint task forces and strike forces: DOJ, FBI, DHS, HHS‑OIG, IRS‑CI, SBA OIG, HUD OIG, DOL, USDA, and others often work together through formal task forces with shared investigative plans, regular deconfliction calls, and common databases so they do not separately investigate the same targets.
• Use case‑assignment and “deconfliction” systems: Agencies check new leads against existing cases (for example, through DOJ’s deconfliction processes or regional fusion centers) to determine which office already has an open matter and who should take lead, and to prevent conflicting undercover operations or overlapping subpoenas.
• Coordinate with state authorities via joint investigations and MOUs: The Minnesota Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, for example, has worked jointly with DOJ, FBI, and HHS‑OIG on the Evergreen Recovery and Housing Stabilization Services cases, sharing data, executing joint search warrants, and aligning charges. The new national fraud enforcement division, according to the fact sheet, is intended to sit above these existing mechanisms, overseeing multi‑district, multi‑agency fraud investigations and providing guidance to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, which formalizes and centralizes this coordination role inside DOJ.