The EO’s use of “Secretary of War” reflects the administration’s re‑establishment of “Department of War” as a secondary title for the Department of Defense and the Secretary of Defense’s use of that secondary title (per the White House’s prior 2025 order). It is not the creation of a new, separate Cabinet office in statute — the existing statutory office remains the Secretary of Defense, and a permanent renaming or new statutory office would require Congress.
Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM) is a heightened U.S. oversight regime — part of the DoD’s Golden Sentry program — that requires serial‑numbered inventories, physical‑security site certifications, and scheduled in‑country inspections of designated sensitive systems. EEUM increases verification after delivery (e.g., 90‑day and annual inventory checks, facility certification, use of EEUM checklists), can require purchaser funding of extra security measures, and is intended to reduce diversion or unauthorized retransfer of U.S. arms.
A Third‑Party Transfer (TPT) is any retransfer of U.S.‑origin defense articles by a recipient to a third country or non‑state actor; U.S. law requires prior written U.S. consent (State’s PM/RSAT handles government‑to‑government TPTs; DDTC handles commercial TPTs under ITAR). TPTs require detailed case documentation, end‑use/retransfer assurances, and can trigger congressional notification/certification rules. Streamlining or realigning the TPT process (as the EO directs) could speed approved retransfers but — if controls or review steps are reduced — raise risks of diversion, weakened end‑use assurances, or technology‑security exposure unless mitigations (e.g., retained EEUM, blanket assurances) are preserved.
The EO creates the Promoting American Military Sales Task Force to be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (or designee) and composed of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and the Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade; it will include service acquisition executives and other implementing‑agency representatives as ex‑officio members. The EO directs the Task Force to develop a charter, coordinate implementation, convene quarterly to review progress, and oversee reporting — but it does not create new statutory authorities or supersede existing agency authorities (the EO preserves current legal powers and requires implementation consistent with law).
The Order amends Executive Order 13637 (2013) to reassign certain intra‑executive delegations for AECA/Section 36 notifications: it directs that some delegated functions under AECA section 36(a) be carried out by the Secretary of War (with consultation with State) and confirms Secretary of State functions for section 36(b)(1), (c) and (d) with notice to the Secretary of War. Those are administrative re‑delegations within the Executive Branch; they do not change the statutory congressional notification and certification requirements in the Arms Export Control Act, so the underlying law would not be altered by the EO alone — permanent statutory changes (e.g., renaming departments or changing Congress’s notification thresholds) would require legislation.
The EO requires the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Commerce to begin publishing aggregate quarterly performance metrics on FMS case development and execution and on adjudication of State and Commerce export licenses. The EO text specifically frames the metrics as aggregate quarterly measures of FMS case development/execution and Commerce/State license adjudication; the EO does not prescribe a detailed metric list, so likely metrics would include case volumes, average case processing/notification timelines, delivery status, and license adjudication times — and the departments are directed to publish them publicly.
Prioritizing partners that have “invested in their own self‑defense” means the U.S. will favor countries that spend and build their own capabilities and occupy strategic geographies (per the EO). Practically, that could shift sales toward regional frontline states and those increasing burden‑sharing; implications include faster deliveries to those partners and strengthened regional deterrence, but also risks: it may deprioritize partners with weaker defenses or poor procurement budgets, raise regional imbalances, and complicate human‑rights oversight if political allies with questionable records receive preferential access. Any such tradeoffs remain subject to existing statutory export controls, end‑use monitoring, and human‑rights policy reviews.