Public reporting does not list a full roster, but it identifies Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF‑401) as a Department of War (DoD)–led task force, stood up by the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Army, with participation from: • U.S. military components – the Army (lead), other DoD services and combatant commands (e.g., NORAD/U.S. Northern Command) working on air and homeland defense. • Federal security and law‑enforcement partners – Department of Homeland Security (including its Science and Technology Directorate), the FBI (including its UAS and Counter‑UAS programs and National Counter‑UAS Training Center), the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration. • Broader federal community – "about 50" total federal agencies with equities in counter‑UAS that attend JIATF‑401 interagency summits.
The task force also works directly with state, local, territorial and tribal law‑enforcement partners, but those local agencies are supported by JIATF‑401 rather than formally composing the federal task force itself.
A “layered counter‑drone defense” means using several types of technology and measures together so that if one layer misses a drone, another can catch or stop it. In the U.S. military and homeland‑defense context these layers typically include: • Detection and tracking (“sensors”) – radars, radio‑frequency (RF) detectors, electro‑optical/infrared cameras and acoustic sensors to spot and follow drones and provide a shared “air picture.” • Identification and command‑and‑control – software and networks that fuse sensor data, distinguish friendly vs. unknown drones, share it across agencies, and let authorized operators decide what to do. • Non‑destructive “soft‑kill” options (“effectors”) – RF jammers, spoofers and cyber tools that can disrupt a drone’s control link or GPS or force it to land or return home. • Destructive “hard‑kill” options – systems that physically destroy or capture drones if needed, such as specialized missiles, guns, high‑powered microwaves, or laser weapons. • Procedures, training and coordination – agreed rules, training exercises and interoperability across DoD and civilian agencies so all these tools work together quickly and lawfully.
JIATF‑401 documents and DoD’s 2024 Strategy for Countering Unmanned Systems both describe this kind of multi‑layered mix of sensors, effectors and mission‑command systems as the goal of the “layered” defense.
Several existing federal laws and authorities allow the Department of War/DoD to support state, local, territorial and tribal law‑enforcement partners with counter‑UAS capabilities, mainly by providing equipment, expertise, training and coordination, while direct “kinetic” actions against drones remain tightly limited. Key authorities include: • 10 U.S.C. Chapter 15 (Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement) – authorizes specified types of support to civilian law‑enforcement agencies (e.g., providing equipment, training, use of facilities), subject to restrictions on direct law‑enforcement roles. • 10 U.S.C. §130i – gives DoD special authority, within the U.S., to detect and, when necessary, mitigate unmanned aircraft that threaten certain “covered” military facilities and assets; DoD leaders have asked Congress to clarify and expand this authority. • Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) framework and related DoD directives – implements how DoD can assist federal, state, local, tribal and territorial agencies (including for homeland security and special events) under request‑for‑assistance processes. • FEMA grant and procurement mechanisms – JIATF‑401 works with the Defense Logistics Agency and FEMA’s counter‑UAS–focused funding opportunity so local agencies can use FEMA grants to buy counter‑UAS and air‑domain‑awareness systems that DoD has tested.
No single statute expressly authorizes DoD to conduct broad domestic counter‑UAS operations for civilian law enforcement; instead, JIATF‑401 relies on this combination of support authorities plus narrowly defined counter‑UAS authorities like §130i.
Publicly available information indicates counter‑UAS systems under the JIATF‑401 effort will be used operationally in several ways to protect military forces and partners: • Around key locations and events – providing detection, tracking and, if necessary, mitigation of hostile or suspicious drones over military facilities, the National Capital Region, the southern border, and major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup and other “national special security events.” • Integrated air‑picture and warning – networking sensors from DoD, DHS, FBI, FAA and local agencies to build a shared picture of low‑altitude airspace (including drones) and alert decision‑makers when a drone appears to pose a threat. • Rapid response options – routing suspected hostile drones to operators who have legal authority to take action (e.g., under 10 U.S.C. §130i at military sites or under DHS/DOJ authorities elsewhere) using pre‑planned procedures. • Support to law enforcement – giving state, local, territorial and tribal agencies access to tested detection and mitigation tools, along with training and technical integration, so they can protect stadiums, crowds and critical infrastructure while coordinating with federal command‑and‑control networks.
These uses are framed in DoD and Army descriptions of JIATF‑401’s mission to “defend the homeland,” “protect personnel, equipment and facilities at home and abroad,” and assist federal and local partners for drone‑related threats.
Safeguards for privacy and civil liberties in domestic counter‑drone operations come from a mix of statute, policy and oversight rules rather than from JIATF‑401 alone. Key elements include: • Statutory limits on counter‑UAS authorities – laws authorizing DHS, DOJ and DoD to detect and mitigate drones (including 10 U.S.C. §130i and related counter‑UAS legislation) typically restrict operations to specific mission types and “covered facilities” and require that any collection, use and retention of data respect privacy and civil‑liberties protections. • Agency privacy and civil‑liberties policies – DHS’s Counter‑UAS Privacy Impact Assessment and UAS best‑practices guidance require that detection/mitigation systems collect only data needed for the mission, minimize retention, and include oversight and transparency measures. DOJ’s UAS policy also mandates safeguards such as limits on data retention and regular privacy reviews. • Interagency legal guidance – an FAA‑led interagency legal advisory on UAS detection and mitigation instructs agencies to analyze and mitigate potential impacts on privacy, civil rights and civil liberties before deploying such technologies.
The specific, internal privacy safeguards used by JIATF‑401 and DoD for domestic counter‑UAS operations have not been fully detailed in public documents, but they are expected to operate within these broader statutory and policy frameworks.
Based on DoD’s own description, Joint Interagency Task Force 401 is a time‑limited, mission‑specific organization rather than a permanent standing body. The Secretary of War’s August 2025 memo (described in DoD reporting) directs the Army Secretary to establish JIATF‑401 with expanded authorities and states that the task force will “maintain operational capabilities for 36 months” as part of a planned three‑year effort to deliver counter‑small‑UAS capabilities.