Sanctioning Oil Traders Funding Maduro’s Corrupt Regime

The four sanctioned entities are all ship-owning or ship‑management companies that move Venezuelan oil:

• Corniola Limited – registered owner of the crude oil tanker NORD STAR (IMO 9323596).
• Krape Myrtle Co LTD – ship manager and operator of NORD STAR.
• Winky International Limited – registered owner of the tanker ROSALIND a.k.a. LUNAR TIDE (IMO 9277735).
• Aries Global Investment LTD – registered owner of the tankers DELLA (IMO 9227479) and VALIANT (IMO 9409247).

According to the U.S. Treasury, these companies “have transported Venezuelan oil” and are being designated for operating in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy, i.e., arranging and carrying shipments of Venezuelan crude that provide revenue to Nicolás Maduro’s government in violation of U.S. sanctions.

The four blocked oil tankers and the companies that operate or own them are:

• NORD STAR (IMO 9323596) – oil tanker that has transported Venezuelan oil; its registered owner is Corniola Limited and its ship manager and operator is Krape Myrtle Co LTD.
• ROSALIND a.k.a. LUNAR TIDE (IMO 9277735) – tanker that has transported Venezuelan oil; its registered owner is Winky International Limited.
• DELLA (IMO 9227479) – tanker that has transported Venezuelan oil; its registered owner is Aries Global Investment LTD.
• VALIANT (IMO 9409247) – another oil tanker in which Aries Global Investment LTD has an ownership interest.

The U.S. Treasury identifies all four vessels as “blocked property” because of their role in transporting Venezuelan oil for the Maduro regime.

In this context, “illegally operating in Venezuela’s oil sector” means these companies are helping produce, transport, or sell Venezuelan oil in ways that violate U.S. sanctions, not necessarily Venezuelan domestic law.

Under Executive Order 13850 and related determinations, anyone “operating in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy” can be sanctioned by the United States. Treasury says these firms and tankers “have transported Venezuelan oil” for the Maduro government despite existing sanctions on state oil company PDVSA, so their activities are treated as sanctions‑evasion and therefore illegal under U.S. law for U.S. persons to support.

Executive Order (E.O.) 13850, signed on November 1, 2018, is titled “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela.”

It gives the U.S. Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, authority to freeze (block) all property and interests in property of persons determined to:

• Operate in specified sectors of Venezuela’s economy (originally gold, later extended by determination to the oil sector and others).
• Be responsible for or complicit in corruption or deceptive transactions with the Government of Venezuela.
• Provide material support to such activities or to already‑sanctioned persons.

Once designated under E.O. 13850, a person or entity is generally added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, making it illegal for U.S. persons to deal with them and blocking any of their property that touches U.S. jurisdiction.

A “shadow fleet” (often called the “dark fleet”) is an informal network of ships used to move sanctioned oil covertly, often by:

• Hiding or spoofing their location signals (AIS manipulation or going “dark”).
• Using false or frequently changing flags and shell companies to conceal ownership.
• Conducting ship‑to‑ship transfers to disguise where oil came from or where it is going.

Treasury says Maduro’s regime “increasingly depends on a shadow fleet of worldwide vessels to facilitate sanctionable activity, including sanctions evasion, and to generate revenue” for its operations. By secretly transporting Venezuelan crude to buyers (often in Asia) despite sanctions on PDVSA, these tankers bring in hard‑currency revenue that sustains the Maduro government and its patronage networks, which U.S. officials describe as an “illegitimate narco‑terrorist regime.”

Directly, these specific measures target only four companies and four tankers, so the immediate volumetric impact on Venezuela’s exports and global oil supply is modest. However, they matter in three ways:

1. Constraining Venezuela’s export logistics:

   • Treasury notes that Maduro’s regime “increasingly depends on a shadow fleet” and that these vessels “continue to provide financial resources” to it.
   • Removing individual tankers from that fleet reduces the number of ships willing or able to lift Venezuelan crude, complicating scheduling and raising freight costs.

2. Deterring other shippers and traders:

   • By designating these firms for “operating in Venezuela’s oil sector,” OFAC signals that any company moving Venezuelan oil faces sanctions risk, which can make banks, insurers, and shipowners more reluctant to be involved.
   • Past episodes of U.S. Venezuela oil sanctions (since PDVSA’s 2019 designation) have repeatedly forced PDVSA to discount its crude and rely on more opaque channels, shrinking its export volumes overall.

3. Limited global market impact but higher friction:

   • Venezuela’s sanctioned exports are a small share of global supply, so a handful of tankers being blocked is unlikely by itself to move global benchmark prices significantly.
   • But in combination with other U.S. actions (like broader enforcement against the Venezuela “shadow fleet”), these steps can tighten access to certain crude grades and raise shipping and compliance costs, especially for buyers that rely on discounted Venezuelan barrels.

Because these sanctions are very recent, there is not yet data on their precise quantitative effect, and analysts generally expect incremental rather than dramatic market impacts.

For the four sanctioned entities and four blocked tankers, the key penalties under U.S. sanctions are:

• Asset freeze (blocking):

  • All property and interests in property of the designated companies and the identified vessels that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.
  • Any entity 50% or more owned (directly or indirectly, alone or with other blocked persons) by a sanctioned party is also automatically blocked.

• Broad transaction ban for U.S. persons:

  • Unless specifically licensed, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from all transactions involving the designated entities or the blocked vessels, including providing or receiving funds, goods, or services.
  • This covers financing, insurance, chartering, bunkering, maintenance, and other commercial dealings when U.S. jurisdiction is involved.

• Secondary sanctions risk:

  • Treasury warns that non‑U.S. financial institutions and other parties may face sanctions exposure if they engage in certain transactions with these blocked persons or vessels.

• Enforcement consequences:

  • Violations can lead to civil or criminal penalties, and OFAC can enforce on a strict liability basis (a U.S. party can be penalized even without intent if it engages in a prohibited transaction).

These measures effectively cut the companies and tankers off from the U.S. financial system and from most legitimate international shipping services that rely on U.S. dollars or U.S.-linked institutions.

The referenced Department of the Treasury press release can be read on Treasury’s website as:

• “Treasury Targets Oil Traders Engaged in Sanctions Evasion for Maduro Regime” (Press Release sb0348, December 31, 2025): https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0348