The TRIPP arrangement is a U.S.-backed plan to create a strategic transit corridor across southern Armenia that connects mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan. The corridor would stay on Armenian territory but be developed and commercially operated by a U.S.-led consortium.
“TRIPP” stands for Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.
Publicly known core provisions of the TRIPP arrangement include:
• Transit corridor location and length – A roughly 42–43 km corridor through Armenia’s southern Syunik region linking Azerbaijan proper to Nakhchivan, forming part of a wider East–West trade route between Turkey and the Caspian/Central Asia.
• Sovereignty and legal regime – The corridor remains Armenian territory and is governed by Armenian law and administration; there is no transfer of sovereignty.
• U.S. development mandate – The United States receives exclusive rights for about 99 years to develop and oversee the corridor and can sublease it to a consortium.
• Infrastructure to be built – Plans call for a motorway/road, railway, oil and gas pipelines, and fiber‑optic (and possibly power) infrastructure along the route.
• Commercial operation – An Armenian‑U.S. company or U.S.-led consortium is expected to manage business operations of the corridor (transport, transit fees, etc.), not its sovereign control.
• Linked economic agreements – Parallel U.S.–Armenia and U.S.–Azerbaijan agreements cover cooperation in energy, infrastructure, technology, and trade, and the U.S. lifted long‑standing restrictions (Section 907) on military aid to Azerbaijan as part of the broader package.
The TRIPP framework is explicitly structured so Armenia keeps full sovereignty and territorial integrity over the route:
• Route remains Armenian territory under Armenian law – The peace framework states the corridor “will remain a part of Armenian territory and be operated according to Armenian law,” even though the U.S. has long‑term development rights.
• Administrative control stays with Armenia – Analyses note Armenia retains administrative control; U.S. and private partners manage commercial operations only, not policing or governance.
• No foreign troops / extraterritoriality – Armenian leaders have assured neighbors that the corridor will stay under Armenian sovereignty and that no U.S. troops will be stationed there; this is stressed in diplomatic outreach to Iran and others.
• Mutual recognition of borders – The broader Armenia–Azerbaijan peace text begins with both sides recognizing and respecting each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is the legal frame for TRIPP.
As of Secretary Rubio’s January 13, 2026 remarks, the TRIPP corridor is politically agreed but not fully in force as a signed and ratified treaty package:
• On 8 August 2025 Armenia and Azerbaijan initialed (agreed in principle to) a peace agreement that includes TRIPP and signed a joint declaration committing to work toward signing and ratifying the treaty; the agreement itself has not yet been fully signed and ratified by both states.
• Analyses in early 2026 note that progress is on hold because neither country has formally signed the peace agreement, and Azerbaijan has conditioned signature on Armenia changing its constitution via a referendum not expected until 2027.
• On January 13, 2026, Rubio and Mirzoyan approved a joint U.S.–Armenia statement on a framework for implementing TRIPP, which is a political and technical roadmap, not the final operating contracts or the fully ratified Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty.
Remaining steps therefore include: formal signature of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty that embeds TRIPP, ratification in both parliaments (after Armenia’s constitutional changes), and conclusion of detailed implementation and concession contracts for building and operating the corridor.
Public sources name only broad implementing structures; they do not publish a full, detailed organigram.
Known elements are:
• United States side
– The U.S. Department of State leads diplomatically; the Federal Register records an executive action establishing a Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity Working Group to coordinate U.S. government policy on TRIPP.
– The U.S. is to grant a long‑term development mandate and then sublease the corridor to a consortium (private operators and investors) that will build and run the infrastructure.
• Armenian side
– The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and senior leadership negotiated the framework; Armenia has stated that an Armenian–U.S. company formed under TRIPP will manage business operations of the corridor rather than exercising sovereign control.
– Line ministries responsible for transport, energy and infrastructure are expected to oversee construction and regulation, but specific agencies and legal acts have not yet been publicly detailed.
• Timeline
– As of January 2026 there is only a framework statement between the U.S. and Armenia; key details, investment contracts, and the underlying Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty still await signature and ratification.
– Independent analyses suggest major legal steps (including Armenian constitutional changes and a referendum expected in 2027) must occur before TRIPP can be fully implemented, so no binding public timeline for completion has been announced.
Officials describe expected benefits in broad economic terms rather than detailed numbers. The main projected gains for Armenia and Armenian businesses are:
• Transit revenues and jobs – As host of the 42–43 km corridor, Armenia would earn transit fees and related tax revenue and see job creation from building and operating road, rail, pipeline and logistics infrastructure.
• New trade access and investment – TRIPP is framed as a way to open Armenia “for business,” integrating it into East–West trade between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and Europe, and attracting U.S. and other foreign investment in transport, energy and associated services.
• Broader economic cooperation with the U.S. – At the White House peace event, Armenia signed separate agreements with Washington on energy, technology and economic cooperation, and later agreed with the U.S. on a framework for TRIPP implementation, which is presented as strengthening U.S.–Armenia bilateral economic ties.
Public sources do not yet provide precise figures (e.g., expected GDP growth, traffic volumes, or specific sectoral programs) tied uniquely to Armenian businesses.
Ararat Mirzoyan is Armenia’s foreign minister (in office since 2021). As foreign minister he has been one of the principal Armenian negotiators and public advocates for the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace framework and the TRIPP corridor.
Specific roles in relation to TRIPP include:
• Participating in and endorsing the Washington‑brokered peace framework of August 2025 that contains the TRIPP project.
• Leading Armenian diplomatic engagement with the United States on TRIPP; in January 2026 he traveled to Washington to meet Secretary Rubio, where they approved a joint U.S.–Armenia statement on the framework for implementing TRIPP.
• Representing Armenia in explaining that TRIPP will remain under Armenian sovereignty and is intended to support Armenia’s economic opening and regional connectivity.