In context, Rubio’s “quarantine on their oil” is not a classic wartime naval blockade of all Venezuelan shipping. It refers to a sanctions-enforcement campaign in which U.S. forces interdict and seize only tankers and cargoes that are already under U.S. sanctions (or otherwise legally targetable, e.g., stateless or covered by boarding agreements) as they carry Venezuelan crude in and out of the country. A recent backgrounder on Operation Southern Spear notes that the U.S. has imposed “a naval quarantine on sanctioned oil tankers traveling in and out of Venezuela,” distinguishing this from a general blockade, which would be treated as an act of war under international law, whereas enforcing sanctions against designated vessels is framed as a law-enforcement action executed under court warrants and forfeiture proceedings.
U.S. officials say they are relying mainly on domestic sanctions and forfeiture law, enforced through federal court orders, rather than claiming a blanket right to control Venezuela’s waters. Under statutes like the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and related sanctions on PDVSA and specific tankers, the Justice Department can bring in rem civil forfeiture cases in U.S. federal courts, obtain seizure/arrest warrants for vessels or their cargo, and then direct U.S. forces to execute those warrants on the high seas. In The Skipper case, for example, a U.S. magistrate judge in Washington, D.C. signed a seizure warrant; the Coast Guard then boarded and seized the ship off Venezuela in international waters pursuant to that order. Legal analyses emphasize that U.S. jurisdiction is asserted because the property is allegedly tied to sanctions violations or terrorism financing and will ultimately be brought into U.S. jurisdiction for court proceedings, not because the U.S. claims general policing authority over Venezuelan waters.
Rubio’s reference to the “Department of War” is a political rebranding of the U.S. Department of Defense; there is no separate federal department by that name. In describing Maduro’s capture and the maritime seizures, Rubio says the “Department of War supported the Department of Justice” and that the quarantine is “a Department of War operation, conducting in some cases law enforcement functions with the Coast Guard,” which matches how DoD typically supports law-enforcement missions. Independent reporting on the Skipper and related interdictions identifies the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard as the operational units carrying out boardings under Operation Southern Spear, with FBI and Homeland Security agents involved in the investigative and forfeiture side.
Public information indicates Maduro’s removal followed a U.S. criminal indictment and was framed as an arrest-and-extradition–type operation, but many legal details are not yet public.
• Indictment and charges: Maduro has faced a sealed/updated federal narcoterrorism and drug-trafficking indictment in New York since 2020; ABC and CBC report that after his capture he was brought to New York to face a four‑count federal indictment for a 25‑year conspiracy to traffic cocaine to the U.S. and related offenses. • Capture: According to ABC’s detailed reporting on “Operation Absolute Resolve,” U.S. Army special-operations forces (Delta) and other military units conducted night-time raids in Caracas, with airstrikes to suppress air defenses, then seized Maduro and his wife at their compound and moved them onto a U.S. warship. • Law-enforcement framing: Rubio told ABC the operation was “an arrest of two indicted fugitives of American justice,” carried out on the ground “by FBI agents, read his rights and removed from the country,” with the Department of Defense (“Department of War”) hitting any threats to the arrest team. • Post-capture process: ABC says Maduro is being held at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn and is expected to make his first appearance in Manhattan federal court, where he will be arraigned on the indictment like any other defendant. CBC similarly reports that he was flown to New York to face prosecution for the Justice Department indictment.
What is not publicly documented is any consent or extradition process from Venezuelan authorities; given the raid was conducted unilaterally, legal experts generally describe it as a forcible rendition that sidesteps ordinary extradition procedures.
In Rubio’s description, a “sanctioned boat” is any vessel already designated or targetable under U.S. sanctions law—typically tankers tied to sanctioned Venezuelan or Iranian entities, or shadow‑fleet ships used to move sanctioned crude. The Skipper, for example, was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2022 for operating in an oil‑smuggling network benefiting Iran’s IRGC and Hezbollah and repeatedly carrying Iranian and Venezuelan oil; it later loaded crude at Venezuela’s Jose terminal and was seized as a “sanctioned shadow vessel known for carrying black‑market sanctioned oil,” according to U.S. and media reports.
For seizure orders, Rubio says “we get orders from courts to go after and seize these…boats,” and that “if you are a sanctioned boat…you will be seized…with a court order that we get from judges in the United States.” In the Skipper case, Reuters reports the seizure warrant was signed by U.S. Magistrate Judge Zia Faruqui of the federal district court in Washington, D.C., and unsealed after the boarding, indicating that at least some of these warrants are being issued by U.S. district courts (often in D.C.) in support of civil forfeiture actions.
Rubio and independent reporting describe a split between law-enforcement and maritime roles:
• FBI: Rubio says Maduro “was arrested on the ground in Venezuela by FBI agents, read his rights and removed from the country,” portraying the FBI as the lead arrest and investigative agency for the narcoterrorism/drug case. In maritime seizures like The Skipper, the FBI and Homeland Security Investigations have reportedly been part of the investigative teams that build the sanctions/forfeiture cases and may be present on boardings to gather evidence. • Coast Guard: The Coast Guard is the primary maritime law-enforcement arm. Legal analysis of The Skipper seizure notes that Coast Guard forces led the boarding “pursuant to a federal arrest warrant” in international waters, exercising their broad statutory authority under 14 U.S.C. § 522 to conduct searches, seizures and arrests on the high seas for violations of U.S. law. In Operation Southern Spear, Coast Guard cutters and boarding teams, often alongside Navy and Marine Corps units, have carried out the physical interdiction and control of targeted tankers.
Under current U.S. sanctions, almost all dealings with Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA or the Venezuelan government are prohibited unless specifically licensed. Chevron’s limited operations have been allowed only under tailored general licenses (e.g., General License 41 and its amendments), which authorized certain transactions “ordinarily incident and necessary” to Chevron’s joint ventures while still forbidding payments of taxes/royalties to the Venezuelan government, dividends to PDVSA, sales of oil to non‑U.S. destinations, and dealings with Russian‑owned entities.
To let other Western private companies invest in Venezuelan oilfields without violating sanctions, OFAC would likely need to: • issue new or expanded general licenses (or specific licenses) authorizing defined categories of oil‑sector investment and operations, • carve out explicit exceptions for dealings with PDVSA and its affiliates within those structures, while keeping other sanctions (e.g., on Iranian or Russian-linked actors) in place, and • condition those licenses on governance and revenue‑sharing reforms, much as GL 41 strictly limited Chevron’s ability to pay the Venezuelan state and to export oil only to the U.S.
Rubio alludes to this model when he notes that Chevron is the only U.S. company currently operating in Venezuela under such licensing and says broader Western participation would depend on “dramatic changes” in how the oil sector is governed.
Delcy Rodríguez is Venezuela’s executive vice‑president and, under the constitution, becomes acting president in the event of the president’s absence. She has been Maduro’s vice‑president since 2018 and is part of the inner Chavista leadership circle.
After Maduro’s capture, Venezuela’s Supreme Court ordered Rodríguez to assume the role of acting president, and outlets like Asharq Al‑Awsat and CBC note that, constitutionally, she becomes interim head of state. However, in her televised speech after the raid she refused to present herself as acting president, insisted that “there is only one president…Nicolás Maduro,” and denounced the U.S. operation as an atrocity. Analysts describe real power as shared among a small civilian‑military cabal that includes Rodríguez and her brother Jorge Rodríguez (National Assembly head) on the civilian side and Diosdado Cabello and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López on the military side. Within that structure, Rodríguez has significant formal authority over the executive branch and, together with the rest of the inner circle, could in principle implement or block changes to security policy, foreign ties (e.g., with Iran/Hezbollah) and oil‑sector governance—but her public posture so far has been to resist, not accept, the changes Rubio is demanding.