Mohamed Irfaan Ali is the President of Guyana, serving as both head of state and head of government and commander‑in‑chief of the armed forces. He was first sworn in as Guyana’s (executive) president on August 2, 2020, and his office leads and coordinates the work of the entire government and implements national policy.
The official U.S. readout of the call only says Secretary Rubio reaffirmed a commitment to deepen security cooperation with Guyana against shared threats such as illicit narcotics and firearms trafficking and to strengthen law‑enforcement and border security; it does not list concrete new assistance, dollar amounts, or specific programs tied to this call.
More broadly, recent U.S.–Guyana security cooperation has included: increased U.S. State Department INL funding for law‑enforcement and border‑security capacity, DEA counternarcotics training, deployment of an FBI technical team to help secure ports of entry, and police‑training programs; and a 2025 U.S.–Guyana memorandum of understanding to work more closely against drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. These illustrate the kind of security assistance framework the call was referring to, even though they were announced in separate statements, not as outcomes of this phone call.
The readout of the Rubio–Ali call does not name specific agencies, but existing U.S.–Guyana security cooperation in narcotics, firearms trafficking, and border security is typically carried out by:
• U.S. side – the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other U.S. law‑enforcement and border‑security partners. • Guyana side – the Customs Anti‑Narcotic Unit (CANU), Guyana Police Force, Guyana Defence Force, and Guyana Revenue Authority (customs), which together form Guyana’s main counternarcotics and border‑security apparatus.
These are the agencies featured in recent U.S. and Guyanese government releases on joint training, funding, and interdiction efforts and are the most likely implementers of the cooperation referenced in the call.
“Foreign terrorist organizations” (FTOs) is a formal U.S. legal term for non‑U.S. groups that the Secretary of State designates under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act because they engage in terrorism and threaten U.S. nationals or U.S. national security. Designation makes it a crime to knowingly provide them with material support and triggers financial and immigration sanctions.
In the Western Hemisphere, the FTO list includes a mix of armed groups and violent criminal organizations such as Colombian guerrilla dissident groups (e.g., FARC‑EP, Segunda Marquetalia), Peruvian Shining Path remnants, and, more recently, major drug cartels and gangs like the Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG, MS‑13, Tren de Aragua, and others. The Rubio–Ali call readout does not identify any particular FTOs linked specifically to Guyana; it uses the term generically for internationally designated terrorist groups that might seek to move people, money, or weapons through the region.
Transnational criminal networks (or transnational organized crime) are criminal groups and their facilitators that operate across national borders, moving drugs, guns, people, and illicit money between countries and regions. They rely on corruption and intimidation of officials, exploit weak law‑enforcement and border controls, launder profits through the financial system, and often use front companies and shell firms to hide their activities.
In the Western Hemisphere, such networks include cocaine‑trafficking organizations linking South American production (e.g., in the Andes and northern South America) to Caribbean and Central American transit routes and on to markets in North America and Europe, as well as regional gangs and smuggling networks. U.S. and UN analyses note that these groups undermine governance and the rule of law, fuel violence, and increasingly intersect with other threats such as terrorism and arms trafficking.
No. The State Department readout of Secretary Rubio’s call with President Ali does not mention any specific timelines, new funding commitments, or planned joint operations; it only reaffirms general commitments to deepen security cooperation and collaborate against narcotics, firearms trafficking, terrorism, and transnational crime.
Detailed funding packages and operational initiatives in the U.S.–Guyana security relationship have been announced separately—for example, a 2024 U.S. Embassy release outlining new INL funding, DEA and FBI support, and police‑readiness programs, and a 2025 memorandum of understanding on enhanced security cooperation—but these were not described as outcomes of this particular phone call.