Statement by the President

S. 1071 is a bill in the 119th Congress titled the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026” (NDAA). When the President signed it, it became the FY2026 NDAA—the annual defense policy law that: (1) authorizes funding levels and programs for the Department of War/Defense and related national‑security agencies, and (2) sets many of the rules and policy directives those agencies must follow for that fiscal year.

The SAFER SKIES Act is a section of the FY2026 NDAA that expands “counter‑UAS” (counter‑drone) powers beyond a few federal agencies to trained State, local, Tribal, and territorial law‑enforcement and corrections agencies. In simple terms, it:

• Lets these agencies detect, track, identify, and physically or electronically “mitigate” (e.g., seize control, jam, or disable) unmanned aircraft that present a credible threat to people, facilities, or operations, in specific contexts such as large public events, critical infrastructure sites, and prisons.
• Conditions this on officers completing a national DOJ/DHS training and certification program, and on using only technologies that appear on a federally approved counter‑drone equipment list.
• Imposes reporting and federal oversight: each mitigation incident must be reported to DOJ and DHS, which in turn must report to Congress.
• As noted in the President’s statement, it also creates a new felony offense for a second violation of restricted national‑defense airspace, increasing penalties for repeat drone incursions.

These are new authorities because previously, only a small number of federal agencies (such as DoD and DHS) were legally allowed to disrupt or destroy drones in U.S. airspace.

The “Golden Dome for America” is the Trump administration’s proposed nationwide, multi‑layered missile and air‑defense system for the U.S. homeland. Key points:

• Launched by Executive Order 14186 in January 2025, it aims to detect and intercept ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, as well as some other aerial threats, using a combination of ground‑, sea‑, air‑, and space‑based sensors and interceptors.
• It is envisioned as an integrated architecture that links existing systems (like ground‑based interceptors and regional defenses) with new capabilities, with the goal of shielding the continental U.S. from “any foreign aerial attack.”
• CRS and budget analyses estimate the plan as extremely expensive; Trump himself has cited a rough total cost on the order of $175 billion and a target of being largely operational by the end of his current term.
• In the NDAA, “fully supporting the Golden Dome for America plan” means Congress is authorizing and funding elements of this homeland missile‑defense build‑out and embedding pieces of the earlier Executive Order into statute.

So, in plain language, Golden Dome is a very large, long‑term project to build a layered “shield” over the United States against advanced missiles and other aerial threats.

“Codify aspects of Executive Orders” means that Congress took policies or rules that previously existed only in presidential Executive Orders and wrote them directly into this statute (the NDAA).

Legal effect:

• An Executive Order by itself is based on the President’s own constitutional or delegated powers; a later President can usually change or revoke it unilaterally.
• Once Congress codifies parts of an Executive Order into law, those provisions become statutory requirements. A future President cannot simply undo them by issuing a new Executive Order; changing them would generally require another Act of Congress or be limited by the courts.

So codification turns what had been internal executive‑branch directions into binding federal law, making them more durable and harder for later administrations to reverse.

In his signing statement, the President identifies several groups of NDAA sections that he says “purport to” limit his constitutional powers, including:

• Foreign affairs / Commander‑in‑Chief powers: Sections 343, 1032–1035, 1048(d)(4)(B), 1266, 5143, and 8304(a), which he says try to dictate U.S. positions in external military and foreign affairs. He signals he will apply them only as consistent with his Article II powers to conduct foreign policy and recognize foreign governments.

• Information‑disclosure and reporting to Congress: Sections 364(a), 383(d), 737, 851, 1070, 1235, 1245, 1253, 1546, 1622, 1806(c), 3111, 6102(b)(3), 6303, 6502(b), 6521, 6524, 6712, 7213, 8102(b), 8315(1)(A)(iii), 8341(a), 8361(b)(3)(A), 8363(h), and 8521, which in his view require disclosure of deliberative or national‑security information protected by executive privilege.

• Security‑clearance and sensitive‑program rules: Section 1622 (reports on compromised/failed sensitive programs) and 6504 (granting clearances to certain people), which he says he will implement only insofar as consistent with his authority to control national‑security information.

• Control of military personnel and materiel: Sections 915(a) and 1046(a), which he reads as constraining his ability to decide what forces and equipment are needed for missions.

• Certification / notice before certain military or diplomatic actions: Sections 1249, 1268, 1507, 1546, and 1655, which require reports or certifications before troop withdrawals or other actions.

• Budget‑form and recommendation requirements: Section 1635 and Section 1638 (funding tied to organizational realignments and delegations), and other sections such as 552, 565(b), 589D(c)(2), 652, 912(g)(3), 1253(f), 1692(c)(2), 1828(c)(4), 1833(e), 2803, 2887(e), 2888(f), 3123, 7262, 7277, 7511(a), 8202(a)(2), and 8521, which direct him to propose specific legislation or budget formats.

Here, “purport to” means “claim to” or “on their face appear to” do something. By using that phrase, the President is signaling that he disputes Congress’s power to impose these constraints where they conflict with his view of his constitutional authority, and he is reserving the right to interpret or ignore them to the extent he believes the Constitution requires.

There is no single statute that spells out all the rules, but U.S. law recognizes several overlapping doctrines and practices that let a President withhold information from Congress for national‑security or confidentiality reasons:

1. Executive privilege (presidential communications & deliberative process)

   • A judge‑made constitutional doctrine, rooted in separation of powers, that lets the President resist disclosure of confidential communications with senior advisers and some internal decision‑making materials.
   • The Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon (1974) recognized a strong but qualified privilege: it exists, but courts may override it when there is a demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a criminal case.
   • In disputes with Congress, its exact limits are less clearly defined; conflicts are often resolved by negotiation or political pressure rather than final court rulings.

2. State‑secrets (military and national‑security) privilege

   • Recognized in United States v. Reynolds (1953): the Executive can refuse to provide information in litigation when disclosure would reasonably risk revealing military or national‑security secrets. Courts generally defer heavily once the claim is properly made.
   • Similar reasoning is often invoked in resisting congressional demands for highly classified operational details.

3. Control of classified information and national‑security systems

   • Under Article II and various statutes, the President controls classification systems and access to “national security information.”
   • The President can argue that giving Congress certain operational details, sources‑and‑methods, or compromised‑program reports would unacceptably endanger national security, and therefore must be limited, briefed only in secure settings, or withheld.

4. Limits and counter‑weights

   • These privileges are not absolute. Courts balance them against the judiciary’s need for evidence (as in Nixon) and may scrutinize state‑secrets claims (as in Reynolds).
   • Congress, for its part, has its own constitutional oversight and appropriations powers and can respond to over‑broad secrecy claims with subpoenas, contempt, funding cuts, or new statutes.

In short, the President relies mainly on constitutional executive privilege, the state‑secrets privilege, and control over classified information, as interpreted by Supreme Court cases like United States v. Nixon and United States v. Reynolds, to justify withholding certain information, subject to judicial review and political checks.

Federal recognition of the Lumbee Tribe means Congress and the federal government now formally acknowledge the Lumbee as a sovereign Indian tribe and treat them like other federally recognized tribes. Under the NDAA’s Lumbee provisions (often referred to as the Lumbee Fairness Act), this entails:

• Application of federal Indian laws: All generally applicable federal Indian statutes, including the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, now apply to the Lumbee Tribe.
• Eligibility for federal programs and services: Lumbee citizens become eligible for federal health care, education, housing, child‑care, disaster relief, and economic‑development programs provided through agencies like the Indian Health Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, HUD, and others, on the same basis as other recognized tribes.
• Service area and “on or near reservation” status: Members living in Robeson, Cumberland, Hoke, and Scotland Counties, North Carolina are treated as living “on or near” an Indian reservation for purposes of service delivery, which affects how agencies allocate resources.
• Land‑into‑trust and reservation status: The law authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for the Lumbee in those counties. Trust land in Robeson County is to be treated as “on‑reservation” land, which is key for tribal self‑government and future economic projects.
• Jurisdiction: North Carolina retains criminal and civil jurisdiction over Lumbee lands unless both the state and federal government later agree to shift some authority; there is a waiting period and consultation requirements for any such change.
• Sovereignty and political standing: Recognition strengthens the Lumbee’s government‑to‑government relationship with the United States, giving the tribe a stronger voice in federal policy, consultation, and potential future negotiations (including, subject to other federal and state laws, issues like gaming compacts).

In practical terms, recognition brings long‑denied legal status, access to federal funding and services, and formal acknowledgment of Lumbee tribal sovereignty, with specific geographic and jurisdictional rules spelled out in the NDAA.