U.S. Designates Networks Supporting Houthi Groups in Yemen, Oman, and the UAE

Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 is a U.S. counter‑terrorism order first issued after 9/11 that lets the government financially isolate terrorists and their supporters. Under it, the State Department and Treasury can:

• Officially designate individuals, groups, companies, and vessels that commit or risk committing terrorism, or that provide them support, as terrorists/Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).
• Block (“freeze”) all property and interests in property of designated persons that are in the United States or held or controlled by U.S. persons (including bank accounts, ships, or other assets).
• Prohibit almost all transactions by U.S. persons or through the U.S. financial system involving those blocked persons (no payments, services, or dealings unless specifically licensed).
• Allow Treasury to designate additional supporters and front companies linked to already‑designated terrorists (derivative designations).
• As amended, threaten secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct significant transactions for SDGTs, which pressures banks abroad to cut ties.

Violating these sanctions can lead to civil or criminal penalties.

“Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT) is the label used for people or entities the U.S. designates under E.O. 13224. Being an SDGT mainly triggers powerful financial and legal restrictions:

• Asset freeze: All property and interests in property of the SDGT that are in the U.S. or held/controlled by U.S. persons are blocked (frozen), and must be reported to the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
• Broad transaction ban: U.S. persons (citizens, residents, U.S. companies, and anyone in the U.S.) are generally prohibited from any dealings with SDGTs—no payments, services, or provision of funds, goods, or technology—unless OFAC issues a license.
• Listing on OFAC’s SDN list: SDGTs are added to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, which banks and companies worldwide use to screen and reject transactions.
• Penalties and spillover effects: Violations can bring civil and criminal penalties. Foreign banks that knowingly do significant business with SDGTs risk secondary sanctions, which can cut off their access to the U.S. financial system, so many avoid any dealings with SDGTs.

In practice, an SDGT designation often makes it extremely hard for the person or company to use the global banking system or conduct international trade.

Ansarallah (often called the Houthis) is a Yemen‑based armed political movement, rooted in the Zaydi Shia community in northern Yemen, that now controls Sana’a and large parts of the country. The U.S. government describes it as an Iranian‑backed group that has carried out attacks beyond Yemen.

The U.S. designated Ansarallah a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on March 5, 2025, after first naming it an SDGT in 2024. In U.S. explanations of the designation, officials say:

• Since 2023, the Houthis have launched hundreds of attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and on U.S. and partner military forces protecting shipping lanes, threatening global maritime trade and freedom of navigation.
• The group’s activities are said to threaten the security of U.S. civilians and personnel, regional partners, and international commerce, which meets the legal criteria for an FTO (foreign organization, engaged in terrorism, threatening U.S. nationals or U.S. national security).

Those stated reasons were the basis for designating Ansarallah as an FTO under section 219 of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act.

U.S. agencies cite several specific financial and logistics networks as evidence of Iranian regime support for Houthi funding and procurement:

• Oil shipments from Iran to the Houthis: The January 16, 2026 Treasury action says the Iranian government both sells and provides a free monthly shipment of oil to the Houthis, using Iranian‑owned or affiliated companies in Dubai (UAE). Firms such as Al Sharafi Oil Companies Services, Adeema Oil FZC, Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC, and Alsaa Petroleum and Shipping FZC are described as key facilitators tying Iranian officials and Iranian nationals to Houthi‑linked oil companies; the Houthis allegedly pay these Iran‑affiliated firms through UAE and Yemen‑based money exchanges like Janat Al Anhar.
• Iran‑based Houthi financier Sa’id al‑Jamal: A 2021 Treasury designation describes an Iran‑based Houthi financial supporter who runs a network of front companies and vessels smuggling Iranian petroleum and other commodities, generating tens of millions of dollars; a significant share of this revenue is routed through intermediaries and exchange houses to the Houthis in Yemen and also supports Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC‑QF) and Hizbollah.
• Syrian Al‑Qatirji Company as a funding channel: In 2024 Treasury sanctioned the Al‑Qatirji Company, saying it exports millions of barrels of Iranian oil to Syria and China to finance the IRGC‑QF and the Houthis. Treasury states that some oil proceeds are ultimately sent to the Houthis, who receive “millions of dollars per month” from Al‑Qatirji.

These U.S. allegations are based on financial tracing, shipping records, and intelligence, and are used to justify designating the named companies, vessels, and individuals under E.O. 13224.

For companies, banks, and shipping firms in or dealing with Yemen, Oman, and the UAE, these new designations have several concrete effects:

• If they are named in the sanctions (like the firms listed in the January 16, 2026 action):

  • All their property and interests in property that touch the U.S. (including U.S. dollar transactions cleared through U.S. banks) are blocked.
  • U.S. persons cannot do business with them without a license (no payments, contracts, cargoes, or services).
  • They are added to OFAC’s SDN list, so global banks and insurers will typically refuse to deal with them.
  • Foreign banks that keep doing significant business with them risk secondary sanctions, including restrictions on access to U.S. correspondent accounts.

• If they are not designated but operate in the region or in sectors like oil, shipping, or logistics:

  • They face heightened compliance risk: they must screen transactions carefully to avoid dealing with listed entities or the Houthis, or risk being sanctioned themselves.
  • Many will adopt a “de‑risking” approach—avoiding Houthi‑controlled ports and counterparties or cutting certain Yemeni, Omani, or UAE clients tied to northern Yemen—to avoid U.S. sanctions exposure.

These dynamics can restrict access to international finance and shipping services for any regional business perceived as close to Houthi‑linked trade.

Yes. Even though the U.S. says it aims to shield aid, these designations can still complicate humanitarian deliveries in several ways:

• Material‑support and sanctions risk: Because Ansarallah is an SDGT and an FTO, paying taxes, customs fees, port charges, or transport services in Houthi‑controlled areas can be seen as providing “material support” to a terrorist group, or as dealing with blocked entities. This legal risk can make NGOs, shipping firms, and banks wary of moving goods into northern Yemen.
• Bank and private‑sector “over‑compliance”: Banks and insurers often respond to complex sanctions by over‑blocking transactions or exiting high‑risk markets, even when humanitarian exemptions exist. This can slow or stop payments for food, fuel, and aid operations and discourage shippers from calling at Yemeni ports.
• U.S. mitigation efforts:
  • When the U.S. first designated the Houthis as an SDGT in 2024, it delayed implementation 30 days and issued broad general licenses for food, medicine, fuel, remittances, telecoms, and port/airport operations to limit harm to civilians.
  • OFAC has since created cross‑program humanitarian general licenses meant to protect aid activities, and has published Yemen‑specific guidance to reassure humanitarian actors that assistance to civilians is allowed.

Despite these licenses, independent analysts and aid groups warn that the combination of FTO/SDGT status and aggressive sanctions on Houthi‑linked networks is likely to chill commercial imports and complicate aid delivery, especially into areas under Houthi control.

Coordination is built into both the legal framework and the way these actions are implemented:

• Mandated international cooperation: E.O. 13224 explicitly directs the Secretary of State, Treasury, and other agencies to “cooperate and coordinate with other countries” through intelligence‑sharing, technical assistance, and bilateral and multilateral arrangements to deny terrorists financing and financial services.
• Using sanctions to signal and pressure partners: State and Treasury press releases on Houthi networks stress that designations alert foreign governments and private sectors to specific front companies, vessels, and facilitators in Yemen, Oman, and the UAE. This encourages local regulators, central banks, and port authorities to freeze assets, deny port calls, or terminate relationships with those actors.
• Secondary‑sanctions leverage on regional banks and firms: Treasury repeatedly warns that foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct significant transactions for SDGTs risk secondary sanctions, including limits on U.S. correspondent accounts. This threat pushes banks in the UAE, Oman, and beyond to cooperate with U.S. measures and adopt stricter controls around Houthi‑linked business.

In practice, State uses diplomatic channels and security partnerships, while Treasury/OFAC uses financial‑intelligence sharing and the threat of secondary sanctions, to push regional partners to help disrupt the named smuggling and revenue networks.