The Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords are a peace agreement signed on October 26, 2025 in Kuala Lumpur by the prime ministers of Cambodia and Thailand, witnessed by the U.S. president and Malaysia’s prime minister, to turn a July 2025 border truce into a more detailed peace framework. The accord (formally the “Joint Declaration…on the Outcomes of Their Meeting in Kuala Lumpur”) requires both countries to: stop using force and settle disputes peacefully; pull heavy and “destructive” weapons back from the border under supervision of an ASEAN Observer Team (AOT); allow ASEAN observers to monitor the ceasefire; carry out joint humanitarian de‑mining along the border; stop using inflammatory or false information against each other; use existing bilateral bodies (Regional Border Committee, General Border Committee, Joint Boundary Commission) to handle border issues; cooperate against cross‑border crime; and, as a confidence‑building step, have Thailand release Cambodian prisoners of war captured in the July clashes once de‑escalation measures are in place.
The October 26 Joint Declaration is the formal legal text of the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords, signed by the Cambodian and Thai prime ministers on October 26, 2025, in Kuala Lumpur. It spells out concrete implementation measures, including: (1) signing Terms of Reference to create an ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) made up of ASEAN personnel to monitor and verify the ceasefire; (2) military de‑escalation by removing heavy and destructive weapons from the border back to normal bases, following a step‑by‑step action plan under AOT oversight; (3) stopping the spread of false information, accusations and “harmful rhetoric” through official or unofficial channels; (4) immediately implementing confidence‑building measures and joint border coordination to restore trust and work toward full restoration of diplomatic relations; (5) coordinating humanitarian de‑mining in border areas without prejudging the final boundary; (6) using the Regional Border Committee, General Border Committee and Joint Boundary Commission as the only channels for handling border disputes and avoiding new encroachments or provocations; (7) formally recognizing the end of active hostilities once these steps are in place; (8) Thailand promptly releasing prisoners of war as a goodwill gesture; and (9) strengthening cooperation, information‑sharing and border controls against transnational crime.
The 18 Cambodian soldiers were detained after being captured by Thai forces during July 2025 border fighting; Thailand treated them as prisoners of war held under the Geneva Conventions until the “end of hostilities.” Thai and Cambodian accounts of the capture differ: Cambodian officials say the troops approached a Thai position with friendly or post‑fighting intentions after a ceasefire, while Thai officials say the soldiers crossed into what Thailand considers its territory and appeared to have hostile intent, so they were arrested as enemy combatants. The October Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords and the December 27 ceasefire both tied their release to progress on de‑escalation; the December 27 agreement specifically said Thailand would return the 18 soldiers if the ceasefire held for 72 hours. After the new truce took effect at noon on December 27 and despite a one‑day delay over Thai allegations of ceasefire violations, Thailand released and repatriated the 18 soldiers on December 31, 2025, in a handover supervised by the International Committee of the Red Cross after 155 days in custody.
The December 27 ceasefire agreement is a truce signed by the Thai and Cambodian defence ministers on December 27, 2025, to stop about 20 days of intense border fighting that killed around 100 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. It applies to both countries’ armed forces along the disputed Thailand‑Cambodia frontier and, according to the joint statement, covers “all types of weapons” and bans attacks on civilians, civilian objects, infrastructure and military targets “in all cases and all areas.” The main terms are: an immediate ceasefire from the moment of signature (put into effect at noon local time / 05:00 GMT on December 27); freezing front lines where they are, with both sides keeping current troop deployments but banning reinforcements or further troop movements; refraining from provocative actions and “false information” that could escalate tensions; allowing an ASEAN observer team to monitor implementation and maintaining direct communication between the two defence ministries; prioritising the return of displaced civilians and cooperation on de‑mining. It does not set a fixed end date, so it is intended as an open‑ended truce, but it includes a 72‑hour benchmark: if the ceasefire holds for three days, Thailand must release the 18 detained Cambodian soldiers, which it did on December 31 under Red Cross supervision.
Publicly, the United States has mainly offered diplomatic and political support to help secure and implement the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords and the October 26 Joint Declaration. U.S. officials helped broker the July truce and the October Kuala Lumpur agreement, and the October 26 Joint Declaration was signed “in the presence of and supported by” the U.S. president and Malaysian prime minister; a White House fact sheet highlights that U.S. diplomacy was central to establishing border observer teams, and it links POW release (the 18 Cambodian soldiers) to the peace accord. The U.S. has since repeatedly welcomed the December 27 ceasefire and formally urged Cambodia and Thailand to “fully implement the terms of the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords,” and the State Department says it “stands ready to support” both governments as they resume implementation of the October 26 measures, without yet detailing specific new programs. Around the peace deal, Washington also offered broader forms of support that can reinforce implementation: removing an arms embargo on Cambodia and restarting U.S.–Cambodia military exercises and training; expanding law‑enforcement and transnational‑crime cooperation with both Cambodia and Thailand; and signing trade and critical‑minerals agreements that are conditional on peaceful relations, which together create diplomatic, security and economic incentives for both sides to adhere to the accords.
Monitoring of compliance is largely in the hands of regional mechanisms rather than any global enforcement body. Under the October 26 Joint Declaration (Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords), Cambodia and Thailand signed Terms of Reference for an ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) made up of personnel from ASEAN member states; the AOT’s mandate is to observe and verify implementation of the ceasefire, de‑escalation measures (such as withdrawal of heavy weapons) and related confidence‑building steps, and to report its findings to ASEAN. The December 27 ceasefire specifies that “a team of observers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)” will monitor the truce, and Thai officials say monitoring will be backed by direct, high‑level communication and coordination between the two defence ministries and armed forces. For the treatment and release of prisoners of war, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has acted as a neutral monitor, visiting the 18 detained Cambodian soldiers and supervising their repatriation. However, there are effectively no hard enforcement mechanisms: neither ASEAN nor the observer team has power to impose sanctions or use force, so compliance depends on political will, reputational costs, and diplomatic and economic pressure from ASEAN states and major backers such as the U.S., China and Malaysia; if either side violates the agreements, the main consequences are international criticism, loss of support and the risk of renewed fighting, not automatic legal penalties.