DHS Science and Technology Directorate summarizes 2025 RDT&E achievements supporting homeland security

The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is the research‑and‑development arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It sits alongside operational components like FEMA, the Coast Guard, and Customs and Border Protection, but its specific job is to:

• Act as DHS’s primary science advisor and technical expert.
• Run research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs to create and assess new technologies for DHS missions (border security, cybersecurity, counter‑terrorism, disaster response, etc.).
• Work with other DHS components, first responders, industry, universities, and national labs to turn promising technologies into tools that front‑line personnel can actually use.
  In short, S&T does the behind‑the‑scenes R&D and technical guidance that supports the rest of DHS in carrying out their security and emergency‑response missions.

The article says S&T “built a custom analytics platform to expand U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP’s) situational awareness of the nation’s air and maritime tracks,” but it does not name the system or list all functions.
From DHS descriptions and related CBP systems, this kind of “next‑gen analytics platform” typically:

• Ingests large amounts of sensor and tracking data (e.g., radar, aircraft flight data, maritime Automatic Identification System (AIS), other surveillance feeds) into one view.
• Correlates and visualizes “tracks” of aircraft and vessels so operators can see where they are, where they came from, and potential anomalies in near‑real‑time.
• Uses analytics (including pattern analysis and, in some DHS systems, AI/ML) to highlight suspicious movements or high‑risk targets to support interdiction and investigations.
  However, DHS has not publicly released a detailed feature list for this specific 2025 CBP platform, so finer‑grained capabilities (exact algorithms, user tools, or system name) are not openly documented.

S&T’s Counter‑Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C‑UAS) program tests and evaluates multiple types of technologies and tactics, including:

• Detection and tracking tools to find drones, such as radio‑frequency (RF) sensors, radar, optics, and acoustic systems, used in both lab and real‑world environments (e.g., the National Capital Region).
• Kinetic mitigation technologies (physically disabling or destroying drones), which S&T reports it “tested several rounds of” in 2025 to protect against drone‑based threats.
• Other mitigation methods like RF‑based takeover or jamming and integrated “layered” defenses, evaluated in partnership with agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service, Federal Protective Service, and local law enforcement.
  The program’s role is to run these technologies through realistic tests, refine operational requirements, and help components select appropriate C‑UAS systems and response tactics.

S&T’s “end‑to‑end fentanyl supply chain model” is a data‑driven analytical model that represents how illicit fentanyl and related synthetic opioids move from production through trafficking networks into U.S. communities.
Functionally, it:

• Integrates intelligence and operational data on production, precursor chemicals, smuggling routes, distribution networks, and seizures.
• Lets analysts explore how changes at one point in the chain (e.g., shutting down a lab or disrupting a shipping route) could affect flows elsewhere.
• Helps identify high‑impact intervention points and anticipate traffickers’ adaptations.
  According to DHS, the model “will give ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) greater insight into the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. as they combat transnational criminal organization (TCO) networks,” and more broadly supports law‑enforcement operations targeting fentanyl supply chains.

The Trace Vapor Generator (often referred to as TV‑Gen) is a portable device that produces a very low, controlled concentration of vapors from hazardous substances such as explosives, narcotics, or fentanyl.
How it works and why it matters for fentanyl detection:

• It generates a stable, trace‑level vapor stream that mimics real‑world airborne contamination, without having to spread actual bulk fentanyl powder in an open environment.
• Investigators and labs can pass detectors (e.g., ion‑mobility spectrometers or other vapor sensors) through this controlled vapor to test how sensitive and reliable they are.
• This allows the National Institute of Justice and others to objectively evaluate and compare fentanyl vapor‑detection systems for use at crime scenes, border crossings, and other locations, improving the selection and calibration of field detectors and ultimately increasing the chance of safely and quickly identifying fentanyl.

The article notes only that S&T, CISA, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) “tested freight train cybersecurity … to identify potential critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies,” without listing specific vulnerabilities.
From related PNNL and DHS material on the same Control Environment Laboratory Resource (CELR) program, the freight‑rail cybersecurity work typically focuses on:

• Vulnerabilities in industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) used to control signals, switches, and train movements.
• Weaknesses in the link between enterprise IT networks and operational rail systems that could allow an attacker to move from business systems into train control.
• The risk that cyber‑attacks on these systems could cause unsafe train operations, misrouting, or service disruptions.
  Mitigation strategies developed and exercised in CELR‑style testbeds generally include:
• Network segmentation and hardened configurations between business and operational networks.
• Monitoring, detection, and incident‑response playbooks tailored to rail control systems.
• Training operators using realistic, scaled rail‑yard platforms to practice recognizing and responding to cyber‑kinetic attacks.
  Because DHS has not yet publicly released a detailed report specific to the 2025 freight‑train exercise, the exact vulnerabilities and countermeasures from that test are not fully described in open sources.

GPS jamming and spoofing and S&T’s recommended best practices are as follows:

• GPS jamming: Deliberately broadcasting radio noise on the same frequencies used by GPS so that receivers can’t pick up the real signal, causing loss of position or timing.
• GPS spoofing: Broadcasting fake GPS‑like signals that mislead receivers into reporting an incorrect location, time, or velocity while appearing to work normally.
  S&T’s Best Practices for Resilient PNT Supporting Critical Infrastructure and its earlier Resilient PNT Conformance Framework recommend that owners and operators of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) systems:
• Assess and understand PNT dependence and risk for their operations.
• Use resilient PNT equipment, including receivers that implement anti‑jamming/anti‑spoofing measures and can detect anomalies.
• Employ diversity and backups: combine GPS/GNSS with other PNT sources (e.g., terrestrial timing, inertial sensors, network time) so a single disrupted source doesn’t cause failure.
• Monitor and log PNT performance to spot unexpected jumps, outages, or inconsistencies and respond quickly.
• Plan for degradation or loss of GPS by having documented procedures and configurations that keep critical services running safely if satellite PNT becomes unreliable.

The Year in Review article indicates that S&T is already supporting security for major events and will continue RDT&E work into 2026, but it does not publish a detailed playbook specific to the U.S. 250th anniversary or the FIFA World Cup. From the same document and related DHS material, S&T’s contributions to 2026 event security include:

• Threat modeling and risk analysis for large gatherings (e.g., work done for the NCAA Final Four and U.S. Open) that can be adapted to 250th‑anniversary celebrations and World Cup matches.
• Evaluation of layered security programs for 2026 FIFA World Cup host cities, including support for SAFETY Act reviews of stadium security technologies and procedures.
• Testing and guidance on counter‑drone, counter‑jamming, and other protective technologies, with training for local, state, and tribal responders on communications‑jamming threats in preparation for the 2026 World Cup.
• Cyber and critical‑infrastructure protection, such as freight‑train cybersecurity testing and best‑practices for resilient PNT, which are relevant to the transportation and digital systems that will support both the anniversary events and World Cup operations.
  Publicly available sources do not yet detail exactly which tools will be deployed at each event, but they show S&T using its RDT&E capabilities to test technologies, develop guidance, and train partners so that security plans for 2026 mass events are based on rigorously evaluated systems and practices.